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Abstract   
Even though cloud computing provides many intrinsic benefits (e.g., cost savings, availability, scalability, 
etc.), privacy concerns related to the lack of control over the storage and management of the outsourced 
(confidential) data still prevent many customers from migrating to the cloud. In this respect, several 
privacy-protection mechanisms based on a prior encryption of the data to be outsourced have been 
proposed. Data encryption offers robust security, but at the cost of hampering the efficiency of the service 
and limiting the functionalities that can be applied over the (encrypted) data stored on cloud premises. 
Because both efficiency and functionality are crucial advantages of cloud computing, especially in SaaS, 
in this paper we aim at retaining them by proposing a privacy-protection mechanism that relies on 
splitting (clear) data, and on the distributed storage offered by the increasingly popular notion of multi-
clouds. Specifically, we propose a semantically-grounded data splitting mechanism that is able to 
automatically detect pieces of data that may cause privacy risks and split them on local premises, so that 
each chunk does not incur in those risks; then, chunks of clear data are independently stored into the 
separate locations of a multi-cloud, so that external entities (cloud service providers and attackers) cannot 
have access to the whole confidential data. Because partial data are stored in clear on cloud premises, 
outsourced functionalities are seamlessly and efficiently supported by just broadcasting queries to the 
different cloud locations. To enforce a robust privacy notion, our proposal relies on a privacy model that 
offers a priori privacy guarantees; to ensure its feasibility, we have designed heuristic algorithms that 
minimize the number of cloud storage locations we need; to show its potential and generality, we have 
applied it to the least structured and most challenging data type: plain textual documents.  
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1. Introduction 
Cloud computing offers many benefits for companies, public institutions and individuals willing 
to store and process their data in the cloud, such as, dynamically scalable resources, improved 
agility and manageability, scalability, availability and universal data access independently of 
geographical location, thus providing computational power and flexibility. Most important, 
cloud computing generally implies costs savings since it reduces infrastructure and maintenance 
costs, thus providing cheap storage capacity and computing. In relation to this, IBM forecasted 
60% of the big organizations are ready to embrace cloud computing in the next years [1]. 
However, security concerns about data loss or leakage since the lack of direct control over the 
storage and management of the outsourced data have proved to be a real threat that prevents 
many customers from migrating to the cloud. In the EU, 39 % of enterprises (57% for large 
ones) using the cloud reported the risk of a security breach as the main limiting factor in the use 
of cloud computing services. More specifically, in a report by the cloud Security Alliance over 
165 IT and security professionals in the U.S., most of the respondents considered cloud storage 
as high risk [2]. The European Network and Information Security Agency identified “loss of 
governance” over the data outsourced to the cloud as a critically important factor [3]. As an 
example, Dropbox is supposed to encrypt user data with the aid of heavy cryptography, but 
private keys are created and managed by Dropbox itself and not by the data owner. Moreover, 
recent security breaches compromising the data of millions of people have mined the trust of 
potential users in the cloud. Some well-known examples include the Sony PlayStation Network 
outage2 as a result of an external intrusion, in which personal details from approximately 77 
million accounts were stolen, the multi-day outage in Dropbox3 that temporarily allowed visitors 
to log into any of its 25 million customer accounts as a result of a misconfiguration problem, or 
the leakage of private photos of a number of celebrities from the Apple iCloud storage service 
as a result of weakly protected login credentials4.  
From another perspective, cloud users may have concerns about what Cloud Service 
Providers (CSPs) intend to do with their (potentially confidential) data. Cloud computing has 
given CSPs the opportunity to analyze and exploit large amounts of personal data. For example, 
a recent privacy policy in Google5 specifies that whatever information a user decides to share 
through any Google service can be used, reproduced, modified or distributed by Google with 
the aim of improving or promoting its services (e.g., the Gmail filtering system scans the 
content of our emails to serve personalized ads). In a similar way, Yahoo! also reserves the right 
to collect and use users’ data and combine them with information obtained from business 
partners6. Data collected by CSPs can be used to benefit the users (e.g., by providing 
personalized services) but, at the same time, they may raise privacy concerns. In a report of the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), it is stated that CSPs regularly collect and analyze users’ 
data without users’ knowledge, and that some of the inferences of that analysis could be 
sensitive; for example, a CSP could identify the users that have diabetes because of their interest 
in sugar-free products and share this information with an insurance company that could use this 
information to classify a person as higher risk [4]. In the current socioeconomic context in 
which electronic data are often considered “the new oil” of this century, user concerns about the 
data monetization actions performed by CSPs and about the harmful consequences that this may 
have (e.g., discriminatory actions in job applications, medical insurances, etc.) are perfectly 
understandable. 
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To mitigate these problems and to regain the user’s control over the protection applied to her 
confidential data prior outsourcing them to the cloud, several mechanisms have been proposed. 
They mainly apply a certain kind of data protection on the client side so that only protected 
outcomes are outsourced to the cloud and so that only the data owner is able to correctly 
reconstruct the data retrieved from the cloud. We discuss them in the next section.  
1.1 Related work 
Encryption is a natural solution for enforcing data protection in the cloud [5]. Several solutions 
based on public and symmetric key cryptography have been presented for cloud storage in 
which data protection is provided via encryption. Encryption is performed before the data are 
transmitted and stored in the cloud, being decrypted only after having been returned to the data 
owner. These solutions have been usually enforced as trusted encryption proxies. For example, 
CipherCloud provides a secure gateway located in a trusted environment (i.e., the user’s local 
network) targeted at several popular Software-as-a-Service CSPs (e.g., Gmail, Salesforce, 
Amazon, etc.). It applies encryption to specific user data (e.g., mail bodies and subject, chat 
messages, etc.) before storing them in the cloud. Cloud services are replicated in the secure 
gateways (i.e., web interfaces, business logics) to provide coherent results to operations like 
searching or sorting. Encryption keys are managed and stored locally under the control of the 
user. PerspecSys follows a similar approach, which consists of a server and a reverse proxy that 
implement data encryption methods. SecureCloud is a solution for Infrastructure-as-a-Service 
cloud-based execution platforms in which application data are stored encrypted in the cloud, 
leaving the key control and the definition of access policies to the user. Both BoxCryptor and 
Cloudfogger focus on providing client-side data encryption for cloud storage services like 
Dropbox or Google drive, by using basic symmetric key encryption (i.e., AES).  
Even though the above systems offer robust privacy-preserving data storage for the end 
users, they face several problems, either technical or user-oriented: 
 The communication between the CSP and the client device is captured and “reverse-
engineered” in order to enrich it with security features (data encryption) that are 
transparent to both the CSP and the client. However, the communication protocol may 
often change, which would require a continuous update of the provided security features, 
a difficult task that could seriously impair the reliability and availability of the service. In 
addition, the CSP itself might also implement specific measures to prevent this approach 
if it is uncomfortable with users that systematically upload encrypted contents to its 
servers. This is especially relevant for CSPs that offer their services free of charge 
because they expect to gain profits from the analysis of users’ data (e.g., Google have 
legal possibilities to access these data, due to the terms of service agreement) and which 
may ban users that only provide encrypted –and thus, useless- data.  
 Because sensitive data are systematically encrypted and stored at the CSP, which is 
supposed to be unaware of this fact, functionalities offered by the CSP can yield gibberish 
outcomes. In this case, only a reduced set of functionalities can be preserved (basically, 
data storage and plain retrieval), or encryption can be applied only on data that are not 
processed in the cloud (e.g., binary files), or cloud services must be replicated at the 
trusted gateway. In the latter case, the gateway is forced to redundantly store unencrypted 
data and to re-implement and reverse-engineer some cloud services, thus defeating the 
whole purpose of data and computation outsourcing. Even though in recent years some 
cryptographic solutions have been proposed with a limited support for a number of 
operations over encrypted data (mainly searches), complex operations would require from 
solutions like homomorphic encryption, which are still far from being efficiently 
applicable in a real setting [6]. Even the more efficient searchable encryption solutions 
[7-9] still require adding a considerable amount of data (e.g., hierarchical indexes) to the 
outsourced data, performing several queries to retrieve the matched data and/or offer a 
limited support for complex conjunctive queries involving logical (AND/OR) and 
relational operators (><) and value ranges. 
 Encrypting the whole data uploaded to the CSP at the client side implies the loss of 
several degrees of magnitude in efficiency with regard to both storage and processing, 
which in the case of cloud computing it would mean defeating its own purpose, because 
one of the main motivation for moving to the cloud, in addition to the provided 
functionalities, is saving costs [10]. Moreover, the management of encryption keys may 
add new security risks at the client side.  
 The vast majority of users are not familiar with the fundamental concepts of cryptography 
and many of them are not capable of properly managing keys or certificates [11]; thus, 
the effectiveness and security of cryptographic solutions may be compromised because of 
a negligent management of cryptographic materials. 
 
To circumvent these problems, we propose using privacy-preserving solutions alternative to 
data encryption, which manage data in clear form. To enforce these, we will rely on the 
increasingly popular notion of multi-cloud, that is, the use of multiple cloud computing services 
in a single heterogeneous architecture [12]. Multi-clouds add several advantages, such as 
reducing reliance on any single vendor, increasing flexibility or mitigating disasters, but we are 
specifically interested in the distributed and unconnected nature of multi-cloud services. This 
opens the door for alternative data protection techniques based on data partitioning or splitting 
[13].  
With data splitting, sensitive data in a document or in a data base are split in chunks and 
stored (in clear form) in different locations so that individual parts do not disclose identities 
and/or reveal confidential information. Specifically, the distributed storage of chunks reduces 
the amount of information that can be gathered by a third party, thus rendering the knowledge 
acquired from data analysis or user profiling incomplete and ambiguous, and also minimizes the 
consequences of potential leakages [14]. At the same time, the fact that (partial) data are stored 
in clear form makes it possible to seamlessly retain a number of cloud functionalities (e.g., 
keyword searches, conjunctive and range queries, statistical calculations, etc.) by just 
broadcasting user queries to the different locations. Even though these functionalities provide 
partial results because they have been applied in partial data chunks, it is possible for the data 
owner, who knows the location of each chunk, to reconstruct the complete result by combining 
and aggregating partial results [15], in an operation much more efficient than data decryption. 
Thus, in comparison with data encryption and, in addition to supporting a larger variety of 
functionalities, data splitting does not have such large overhead associated with query 
processing [14, 15]. Finally, in scenarios in which the CSP expects non-encrypted data, 
individual chunks (e.g., pieces of a document, separate attributes value of a database) may still 
be useful, because the CSP can still perform data analyses and extract -partial- conclusions.  
Many of the splitting mechanisms proposed in the literature perform the data partitioning at a 
binary level. For example, in [16], the authors split user files in bytes, which are shifted and 
recombined into a fixed set of parts which are finally stored in different locations. In [14], each 
file to be outsourced is associated with a privacy level, which is chosen by the user according to 
the sensitivity of its contents. Then, chunks of files are created based on the standard RAID 
storage mechanism, and those with a higher privacy level are stored in the location in which the 
user has more trust. This kind of mechanisms, in which data partition is done according to a 
fixed criterion and bytes are alternatively picked and recombined, are well-suited for purely 
binary or even multimedia files, whose contents are usually stored but not processed by the 
cloud. However, for files whose contents should be processed by the cloud (e.g., textual 
documents such as e-mails or Word files, structured databases, etc.), in order to provide 
functionalities (e.g., searches, computations), the output they produce offers neither privacy nor 
utility guarantees. On the one hand, it is not possible to ensure that chunks of bytes do not 
contain enough data to cause disclosure if they are too large; on the other hand, it is not possible 
to guarantee cloud functionalities or retain partial data utility for the CSP if chunks are too small 
or arbitrarily combined. This makes it difficult for the users to understand the kind of protection 
and utility preservation that a specific method is achieving, which inherently depend on the 
semantics of the data to be protected. 
At an attribute level, all data splitting approaches focus on structured (SQL) databases. In this 
scenario, data splitting can be horizontal (sets of data records are stored separately) or vertical 
(sets of attributes are stored separately). However, as stated in [15], horizontal partitioning is of 
limited use in enabling privacy-preserving decomposition because disclosure often arises from 
the correlation between attributes rather than from different records, which are usually 
independent. Vertical splitting is proposed in [13, 15, 17, 18] to ensure confidentiality at the 
record level: identifying attributes of the database (i.e., those that unequivocally identify the 
individual assocaited to the record, such as the SS number) are encrypted, whereas quasi-
identifiers (i.e., those that individually do not cause disclosure but that, in combination, may 
unequivocally identify individuals, such as job+address+age), are split and stored in different 
locations. Both [15] and [18] limit the number of locations to two, because they assume that 
there is a unique set of quasi-identifying attributes. which does not necessary hold. In this 
manner, disclosure is avoided while maintaining data utility at attribute level. Moreover, they 
also propose different algorithms to determine the best decomposition for minimizing the cost 
of the subsequent SQL queries, which need to be broadcasted and their results aggregated. Even 
though these methods offer more robust privacy guarantees and better preserve functionalities 
than binary appraoches, they strictly rely on the structure of the data (i.e., attributes and records) 
and on a set of manually defined rules that specify the combinations of attributes that may cause 
disclosure and, thus, the splitting criterion. As a result, they cannot be applied to unstructured 
data, such as documents, and may not scale well with large datasets because of the human 
intervention needed to define the risky combination of attributes for each dataset. Moreover, it 
has been acknowledged that defining such risky combinations is a costly and difficult task even 
for expert human sanitizers [19].  
1.2 Contributions and plan 
To tackle the limitations of the related works depicted above, in this paper we present a 
semantically-grounded data splitting protection mechanism (semantic data splitting for short) 
for data outsourced to the cloud. As the main innovation, our approach assesses the actual 
semantics of the data to be protected and of the privacy requirements of the user in order to i) 
automatically detect the pieces of data that may cause disclosure and ii) automatically 
orchestrate the splitting of data so that the privacy of the user is guaranteed. Contrary to 
methods partitioning data at a binary level [14, 16], in our approach, the data partition and the 
distributed storage of data chunks are driven by the semantics and sensitiveness of the data 
contents and the privacy requirements of the user. Thus, the contents of the resulting chunks are 
not arbitrary, and it is ensured that they do not incur in privacy breaches. This also contrasts 
with approaches in which the responsibility of defining the specific data to be protected (e.g., 
files, DB attributes, etc.) is left to the user [14, 18], a solution that may be unfeasible in many 
scenarios, given the large amount of documents that are outsourced to the cloud and the lack of 
knowledge of many users regarding the privacy risks of their own data. Finally, contrary to 
methods focusing on structured databases [15, 17, 18], our approach is solely based on data 
semantics, and thus, it can be applied to any kind of data, regardless of whether they are 
structured or not. To show the potential and the generality of our approach, in this paper we 
focus on the storage of raw textual documents (e.g., e-mails, Word files, etc.), which are the 
most challenging to protect because of their lack of structure [19] while, at the same time, they 
constitute the most common way to exchange -potentially sensitive- information between 
human actors. 
The semantic ground of our method is inspired by the state of the art in document 
sanitization/redacting techniques [20-24], which strive at automatically identifying and 
protecting sensitive entities in input documents. To provide a priori privacy guarantees, our 
proposal is designed to fulfill an inherently semantic privacy model for document protection: C-
sanitization [25, 26]. By instantiating and enforcing this privacy model, data owners can 
intuitively define their privacy requirements according to the semantics of the data that they do 
not want to disclose to the cloud and to potential attackers.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the security model and 
presents the architecture of our system. Section 3 discusses the notions related to the protection 
of plain unstructured documents and the privacy model in which our approach relies. Section 4 
presents the privacy-preserving methodology that detects risky terms and splits and stores 
document chunks in a multi-cloud while fulfilling the privacy requirements of the user. 
Moreover, we also present some heuristics to minimize the number of cloud locations we need 
to fulfill with those requirements, and detail how functionalities (retrieval, updates, and 
searches) can be seamlessly supported and how data and query results can be semantically 
reconstructed. Section 5 discusses the security, efficiency and support of outsourced 
functionalities of our approach against cryptographic methods. Section 6 details the evaluation 
of the system with several highly sensitive documents and privacy criteria, and measures the 
efficiency of the allocation of data chunks according to a cost metric. The final section presents 
the conclusions and depicts several lines of future research. 
2. Security model and system architecture 
We assume in our security model that the user does not trust any CSP to properly preserve her 
privacy. We also assume that all CSPs are honest but can be curious, that is, they may actively 
gather, compile and analyze the data they store, as well as the queries they receive from the 
users if, by doing so, they expect to gain additional user data or break any privacy measure that 
the user may have implemented over the data prior outsourcing them. In any case, the CSP, as a 
commercial provider of services, will not act maliciously against the user (e.g., consciously 
altering or deleting data) and will follow the protocols as expected, i.e., it is honest. 
We also assume the availability of several CSPs that provide a homogenous service, that is, a 
multi-cloud, and offer a pool of locations in which data can be stored. In principle, we assume 
that the different CSPs are independent from each other and, thus, they do not collude to 
aggregate the partial data they store in the hope of breaching the user privacy. In any case, as we 
discuss below, our system will also offer some intrinsic protection in the advent of such 
collusion. 
Finally, we assume that the user side is fully trusted and secure, because it was the place in 
which the data were initially stored in clear form. Because of this, we can deploy a local 
application or a proxy on the user side that can securely process the clear data prior outsourcing 
it to the cloud and store the metadata needed to process subsequent queries on those data and 
reconstruct the results. In some scenarios (e.g., an enterprise intranet), this secure 
application/proxy could be shared among different end users (e.g., employees). In such case, 
cloud storage locations will be shared among the different users. The application/proxy will 
manage the pool of available cloud locations transparently for the users.  
Moreover, the user may specify a set of privacy requirements, which define the topics that 
should be protected in any data outsourced to the cloud (e.g., identities, locations, healthcare 
data, etc.), and up to what degree, i.e., the maximum level of semantic disclosure that the user 
allows for each topic. Requirements may be related to identities, thus requiring protection 
against identity disclosure, and/or to confidential data, i.e., attribute disclosure. Contrary to 
previous works [15, 18], these requirements are defined at a conceptual level rather than at 
data/structural level (e.g., combinations of risky attributes in a structured database). According 
to the scenario described above, the architecture we propose is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. General architecture of the system. 
 
The semantic data splitting proxy performs two main actions: data storage in the cloud and 
data retrieval from the cloud as a result of a user query. The logics of the first action are 
depicted in Figure 2. First, the proxy receives the data to be stored and assesses the disclosure 
risks of the content. To do so, it relies on the privacy requirements defined by the user, so that 
those terms whose presence or co-occurrence in the input data may violate the user privacy are 
automatically tagged as risky. These tagged data are then passed to the splitting module that, 
according to the risky terms and the constraints defined in the privacy requirements, decides 
how data are split and how many storage locations are needed; each piece of data that can be 
safely stored together constitutes a data chunk. It also stores the splitting criterion in a local 
database as metadata, so that the system can properly process future queries over the data and 
aggregate the partial results, and forwards each data chunk to a separate CSP. In this manner, 
we ensure that the splitting process is lossless, that is, we can reconstruct the original results if 
needed without having to store the whole data on local premises, and privacy preserving, since 
the contents stored in each separate CSP do not incur in a privacy threat according to the 
privacy requirements of the user [15]. 
Notice that, if several users employ the same proxy and, thus, share the same pool of cloud 
locations, each location may store chunks of clear data from different users, i.e., the split data of 
several users are merged at each cloud location. Because the proxy is the only one capable of 
interpreting which chunk corresponds to which user, this provides a degree of protection against 
the collusion of several CSPs: even though CSPs may orchestrate efforts to aggregate the partial 
data they store, they will fail because they are not able to unequivocally discriminate the user to 
which each data chunk corresponds.  
 
 
Figure 2. Data outsourcing workflow to a multi-cloud via semantic data splitting. 
 
On the other hand, the logics related to the execution of a user query over the outsourced 
(split) data and the aggregation of the final results are depicted in Figure 3. First, the query is 
processed, so that the storage locations of the data the query refers to are retrieved from the 
local metadata database. Then, the query is replicated as many times as data chunks the data 
have been split into, and these queries are forwarded to the corresponding CSPs. As a result, 
each CSP provides a set of results that represent a partial view of the complete result. Finally, 
the proxy aggregates these results according to the criterion used to split them, also stored as 
metadata, and provides the complete result to the user.  
 
Figure 3. Query answering workflow with split data. 
3. Data protection with privacy guarantees 
Several privacy models have been proposed by the computer science research community to 
offer sound privacy guarantees to data protection. Many of these, such as the well-known k-
anonymity model [27, 28] and its extensions to plain textual documents [29], exploit the regular 
structure of the data (e.g., the records in a structured database, collections of documents with an 
homogenous structure) to define the privacy guarantee as a probability of re-identification of 
one individual within the dataset to be released. Privacy is thus enforced by making the 
individual’s identifying data indistinguishable enough within the dataset, i.e., it mainly protects 
data against identity disclosure. Other well-known models, such as differential privacy [30], 
also deal with structured data sets and require attributes with bounded domains. 
However, in our setting, documents are generated independently by each user and, thus, they 
should be protected individually according to the semantics they disclose; free text is also 
unstructured and unbounded. Moreover, we would like the instantiation of the privacy model to 
be intuitive enough so that it can be employed by users to clearly define their privacy 
requirements; at this respect, most privacy models are instantiated by means of abstract 
numerical values [21, 28, 30], which many users find difficult to understand [31, 32]. Finally, 
we would also like to seamlessly support protection against identity and/or attribute disclosure.  
As far as we know, the only privacy model that fits with this scenario and these requirements 
is C-sanitization [25, 26], a general privacy model for (textual) document sanitization. C-
sanitization defines the desired level of privacy by means of a set of topics, C (e.g., identities, 
confidential data) in a way that the privacy guarantees are fulfilled if the protected outcome 
does not contain any term that, individually or in aggregation with other terms co-occurring in 
the same document, reveals the semantics of the sensitive entities in C. For example, given a 
medical record, its {AIDS, HIV}-sanitized version should not contain terms (e.g., synonyms or 
acronyms of AIDS and HIV, but also combinations of treatments or drugs) by which a 
knowledgeable attacker can unequivocally infer that the protected document contents refer to 
AIDS or HIV.  
Formally, the model is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 1. (C-sanitization). Given an input document D, the background knowledge K that 
is available for potential attackers, and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that 
D’ is the C-sanitized version of D if D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T that can, 
individually or in aggregate, unequivocally disclose any entity in C by exploiting K. 
 
To more accurately configure the tradeoff between the degree of protection (i.e., prevention 
of sensitive information disclosure) and data utility resulting from protection, we can define a 
threshold of maximum disclosure by specifying a set of generalizations g(C) for the sensitive 
entities in C [26]. For example, an {(AIDS, disease), (HIV, virus)}-sanitized document would 
not only prevent disclosing AIDS and HIV but, at most, it would only disclose that the contents 
refer to a (generic) disease and virus, respectively. Formally: 
 
Definition 2. ((C, g(C))-sanitization) Given an input document D, the background knowledge 
K, an ordered set of sensitive entities C to be protected and an ordered set of their corresponding 
generalizations g(C), we say that D’ is the (C, g(C))-sanitized version of D if D’ does not 
contain any term t or group of terms T that individually or in aggregate and, for all c in C, 
disclose more than the semantics provided by their respective g(c) by exploiting K. 
 
By instantiating the C-sanitization model, users can intuitively define their privacy 
requirements, because the parameter C states, by means of linguistic labels, the set of sensitive 
topics that the protected document would not disclose. Another advantage of this model is that it 
can be easily instantiated to enforce the privacy requirements of current legislations and 
regulations on data privacy [33-38], whose definitions of sensitive data are also linguistic (e.g., 
religion, sexuality, race, healthcare data, etc.). Finally, the use of generalizations, g(C), as 
disclosure thresholds for C, permits to lower the amount of semantics that can be disclosed 
about C, thus forcing the system to implement a stricter sanitization. Semantically, the use of 
generalizations in the model instantiation to finely tune the privacy guarantees is very intuitive 
and provides a clear picture on the amount of knowledge that external entities (readers, data 
analysts and attackers) can learn of C in the protected document.  
4. Data outsourcing with privacy guarantees via C-sanitization and 
semantic data splitting 
In this section, we detail our semantic data splitting mechanism that, on the contrary to related 
works on data splitting [13, 15, 18], is able to automatically orchestrate the splitting process, 
and the subsequent queries and data retrieval, according to the semantics and privacy risks 
inherent to the data. To offer privacy guarantees, the protection offered by our solution fulfills 
the C-sanitization model introduced above; in this way, the partition and distributed storage of 
chunks in separate CSPs will be done according to the semantics and sensitiveness of the 
document contents and the privacy requirements of the user (stated via instantiating the model), 
in a way that the chunks separately stored in the cloud do not incur in privacy breaches.  
The process consists of two steps: (i) detection of those terms in the input document that 
cause disclosure risk according to the privacy requirements; and (ii) splitting and distributed 
storage of those terms in order to prevent disclosure.  
4.1. Detection of risky terms 
The automatic detection of risky terms occurring (and co-occurring) in the input document is 
driven by the notion of disclosure stated by the instantiation of the C-sanitization model, which 
states the privacy requirements. In this respect, the semantic disclosure that terms t/T cause with 
regard to the entities to be protected C, can be naturally enforced in information theoretic terms 
by quantifying the amount of information given by t/T about C. Under the umbrella of the 
Information Theory, the semantics encompassed by an entity c can be quantified according to its 
Information Content (IC(c)); likewise, the semantics that a term t or a group of terms T discloses 
about an entity c are measured according to their Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI(c,t)). 
Thus, we can reformulate the general Definition 1 in information theoretic terms as follows: 
 
Definition 3. (Information Theoretic C-sanitization). Given an input document D, the 
background knowledge K and a set of sensitive entities C to be protected, we say that D’ is the 
C-sanitized version of D if, for all c in C, D’ does not contain any term t or group of terms T so 
that, according to K, PMI(c;t)=IC(c) or PMI(c;T)=IC(c), respectively. 
 
By applying this to our scenario, those terms t (or group of terms T) in the input document 
whose PMI(c;t)=IC(c) (or PMI(c;T)=IC(c)) for any c in C will cause disclosure risk. The IC of 
the entity c measures the information/semantics that should be hidden because of its sensitive 
nature, while the PMI measures the amount of information/semantics that a term t or group of 
terms T reveal about c. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the IC and the PMI of two 
entities: cancer is the entity c to be protected and surgery is the term t occurring in the 
document, which is semantically related to c. The figure also highlights, in gray, the disclosure 
of information/semantics that t causes to c. 
 
 
Figure 4. Left circle: information/semantics encompassed by cancer (the entity c to be protected); right 
circle: information/semantics encompassed by surgery (the term t appearing in the input document); 
grayed area: information/semantics that surgery discloses from cancer. 
 
The disclosure risk assessment can be extended (and made stricter) if generalizations of the 
sensitive entities g(C) are defined as thresholds of maximum disclosure. By adapting Definition 
2 in information theoretic terms, disclosure risk would now happen for those terms t (or group 
of terms T) in the input document whose PMI(c;t)>IC(g(c)) (or PMI(c;T)>IC(g(c))) for any c in 
C. 
In practice, the IC of c is computed as the inverse of its probability of occurrence:  
( ) log ( ).IC c p c
 
       (1) 
The probabilities needed to measure the informativeness of textual terms are usually assessed 
from corpora [39]. In this way, general terms will provide less information than more specific 
ones because the probability of appearance in a discourse of the former is greater. 
Likewise, the PMI(c;T) is computed as the normalized probability of co-occurrence of c and 
T={t1,…,tn}, given their joint and marginal probabilities: 
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(2) 
To capture a realistic notion of disclosure, probabilities of (co-)occurrence should be assessed 
from a corpus that truthfully represents the knowledge K available to potential attackers to 
perform their inferences. Thus, in the worst-case scenario (i.e., perfectly knowledgeable 
attackers), the corpus should be large and heterogeneous enough to cover and capture the 
information distribution at a social scale. As discussed in [20], the Web is well-suited for this 
purpose, since it offers the largest amount of directly accessible information/knowledge sources 
and it is so large and heterogeneous that it can be considered a realistic proxy for social 
knowledge. Moreover, term probabilities can be computed efficiently by querying terms and 
term combinations in publicly available Web search engines and evaluating the resulting page 
count [40] (thus avoiding the need to locally store a large textual corpus for IC calculation): 
( )
_ _ ( ) ,
_
p t
web page count t
total webs

       
(3) 
where total_webs is the number of webs resources indexed by the Web search engine.  
We deployed this Web-based information theoretic assessment of disclosure risks to detect 
risky terms at the proxy installed at the user side. In the following we detail the algorithm that 
implements this process. 
 
Algorithm 1. Detection of risky terms 
Input:  D  //the input document  
        C    //the ordered set of entities to be protected 
        g(C) //the ordered set of generalizations corresponding to C (optional) 
Output: RT    //the set of risky terms 
 
01  for (n=1;n<=MAX;n++) do //cardinality of the combination of terms to evaluate    
//create all combinations of terms in D of cardinality n sorted by informativeness 
02  Combn=createCombinations(D,n);   
03   while (not(empty(Combn))) do //evaluate each combination 
04   T=getCombination(Combn); //obtain the next (set of) term(s)  
//evaluate if PMI(ck;T)>IC(g(ck))
 
ck є C until true or ck=null  
05     if (checkDisclosure(C,g(C),T)) then  
06     add(T,RT); //add the risky term(s) T to RT 
07     remove(T,Combn,D); //remove T in the combinations and in D 
08   end if 
09  end while 
10 end for 
11 return RT; 
 
Algorithm 1 iteratively generates and evaluates all possible combinations of terms (co-) 
occurring in D with increasing cardinality (lines 1 and 2). Thus, in the first iteration, the 
elements of Comb1 are single terms, which are evaluated for disclosure (line 5), whereas in 
subsequent iterations, we evaluate the risk caused by the co-occurrence of several terms. In lines 
5-6, those terms t (or group of terms T) in the input document whose PMI(c;t)>IC(c) (or 
PMI(c;T)>IC(c)) for any c in C are tagged risky. If any of these terms are risky according to the 
privacy criterion stated by the model instantiation, they are added to the set of risky terms RT 
(line 6); moreover, they are also removed from the remaining combinations of the same 
cardinality (in Combn) and also from the input document D, so that they are no longer 
considered when creating new combinations (line 2) with larger cardinality. By iteratively 
removing terms already assessed as risky, we minimize the number of combinations (and, thus, 
of queries to the Web Search Engine) that should be evaluated for disclosure. 
4.2. Semantic data splitting and distributed storage 
In the standard context of document redaction/sanitization, in which protected versions of the 
input documents should be released atomically, terms detected as risky are usually removed or 
generalized, so that the level of disclosure they caused is lowered below that specified in the 
privacy requirements. This produces a loss of utility, since some of the original terms are no 
longer present (in their fully specified form) in the protected output. 
In a multi-cloud storage scenario, however, we can take advantage of the availability of 
several (independent) cloud storage locations to split and store clear data in a privacy preserving 
way while retaining –most of- the outsourced functionalities. As introduced in section 2, 
because the different cloud storage locations are aware neither of each other nor of the splitting 
criterion implemented by the local proxy, CSPs would not able to reconstruct the complete data 
in an unequivocal way, thus preventing disclosure. Moreover, since a single cloud location can 
be shared by several users, because the distributed cloud storage is transparently managed by 
the proxy, the split clear data of each user will also be merged with that of other users; this adds 
randomness to the outsourced data stored at each location, and offers a better protection against 
collusion attacks of several CSPs that may try to aggregate partial (merged) data chunks.  
In any case, and in coherence with the C-sanitization privacy model on which we rely, the 
splitting process should guarantee that each separately stored chunk of data fulfills Definitions 
1-2 through their information theoretic enforcement. According to the risky terms RT detected 
in the previous step, we may distinguish two cases. First, we find individual terms t whose sole 
occurrence in the document causes a disclosure risk according to the privacy criterion. For 
example, if we want a medical record to be cancer-sanitized, the sole occurrence in the 
document of synonyms of cancer such as malignant neoplasm (whose semantics are equal to 
those of cancer), or of specializations such as breast cancer or melanoma (whose semantics 
encompass and extend those of their generalization cancer), completely discloses the semantics 
of cancer. Figure 5 illustrates both situations in terms of informativeness. 
 
 
Figure 5. Grayed area: disclosure of cancer; on the left: melanoma is a taxonomical specialization of 
cancer; on the right: malignant neoplasm is a synonym of cancer. 
 
Moreover, if we use generalizations of cancer (e.g., disease) to set a stricter privacy criterion 
in the model instantiation, other individual terms may also cause disclosure. For example, in a 
(disease, cancer)-sanitized document, any specialization of disease that is also a generalization 
of cancer, such as tumor, will also cause disclosure. These individual terms can be considered 
identifiers of the entity to be protected and, thus, they should not be stored in clear form in any 
cloud location. These terms, which, as it will be discussed latter, represent a small percentage of 
the amount of terms that should be protected, are stored locally by the proxy.  
Second, and more usually, we can identify combinations of terms RTi={t1,…,tj,…,tn} co-
occurring in the document that, even though each tj does not produce enough disclosure to be 
considered risky, their aggregation does; that is, they can be considered quasi-identifiers of the 
entity to be protected. In this case, the actual disclosure produced by RTi is the union of the 
individual disclosures caused by each tj in RTi with regard to c, which can be computed using 
Eq. (2). For example, as illustrated in Figure 6, if a medical record should be cancer-sanitized, 
the co-occurrence of the set of terms RT={blood in the urine, lump, fatigue} may be risky 
because their aggregation is highly correlated with cancer, even though each individual term 
only produces a partial disclosure. 
 
 
Figure 6. Grayed area: disclosure of cancer caused by the co-occurrence of fatigue, lump and blood in the 
urine. 
 
To protect these combinations of risky terms, we exploit the independent and distributed 
storage offered by a multi-cloud by separately storing, in clear form, individual terms tj or 
subsets of RTi. In this manner, we prevent aggregate inferences and avoid disclosure but retain 
functionalities, because partial data is stored in clear. The data chunks should be created in a 
way that, individually, they fulfill the condition stated by the instantiation of the C-sanitization 
model; then, they should be stored separately so that they remain unlikable to the CSPs. This 
will also protect against accidental leaks of information by the CSP or external attacks, because 
only partial (C-sanitized) information can be gathered. The remaining terms in the document 
that were not considered risky can be put together in a separate chunk and stored in a different 
cloud location. 
To reconstruct the whole document and to provide coherent and complete results to user 
queries, the proxy will store, on local premises, the following metadata for each outsourced 
document: 
 The list of identifying terms, which are not outsourced to the cloud due to their individual 
sensitiveness, sorted according their appearance in the document. 
 A list with the cloud locations of the quasi-identifying terms tj in RTi, with their offset 
within the data chunk in which they are contained. The list is sorted according to the 
order of appearance of quasi-identifying terms in the document. 
 The cloud location of the sanitized document resulting from removing identifying and 
quasi-identifying terms. The positions they occupied within the document are tagged with 
sentinels ($id$, $qi$, respectively); in this way, the proxy will be able to reconstruct the 
document content by simply replacing them with the elements in the local sorted list of 
identifiers, and the outsourced quasi-identifiers retrieved from the appropriate CSPs, 
according to the local sorted list of cloud locations and their offsets within such locations. 
 
More details on how data retrieval, search queries and other cloud functionalities exploit 
these metadata are provided in section 4.4. 
The main burden of the data outsourcing process is the number of required locations; also, a 
large number of locations means that a large number of queries should be performed to gather 
the whole document content. Two aspects have a main influence on the number of required 
locations. On the one hand, the instantiation of the privacy model (by means of disclosure 
thresholds g(C) for the sensitive entities C), enables to configure the trade-off between the level 
of protection and the number of different cloud locations required to fulfill the privacy 
guarantee; that is, the more general the thresholds, the stricter the protection and the larger the 
number of locations needed to fulfill the privacy criterion. On the other hand, if documents are 
large, their discourses are tight (so that co-occurring terms are highly correlated), and/or the 
privacy requirements are strict, the number of quasi-identifiers to be separately stored could be 
large. Notice, however, that a cloud location can be shared for different documents and users. 
To minimize this cost, and to render the solution practical, in the following we propose a 
greedy splitting and allocation algorithm that incorporates several heuristics to minimize the 
number of cloud locations cLoc required to store documents while ensuring that each data 
chunk fulfills the privacy model. The main idea of the algorithm is to put as many terms tj in 
each chunk, chunkp, as possible, while their aggregation still fulfills the privacy criterion (i.e., 
the disclosure allocation “budget” of the chunks has not been consumed); only when the 
criterion is not fulfilled, a new chunk is created and the process is repeated again until no more 
terms remain to be allocated. 
  
Algorithm 2. Data splitting and distributed storage 
Input: D  //the input document  
       RT  //the set of risky terms  
     C    //the ordered set of entities to be protected 
       g(C) //the ordered set of generalizations corresponding to C (optional) 
 
01 D’=D; //D’ will be the sanitized version of D 
02  while ((not(empty(RT)))) do 
03  RTi=getSensitiveCombination(RT);  
04   if (|RTi|==1) then //if RTi is an individual term: an identifier 
05      replace(RTi,”$id$”,D’); //replace RTi by the string $id$ in D’ 
06   add(RTi,list_ids); // the term RTi is added to a list of identifying terms 
07    else //RTi is a set of terms 
08   replace(RTi,”$qid$”,D’);  
09   ITi=getMostInformativeTerm(RTi); //allocate first the term with highest IC 
10   while (not(empty(RTi)) //until all terms in RTi have been allocated 
11         location_found=false;  
12          chunkp=first(Chunk_set); //a candidate chunk to store ITi  
13          while (not(location_found) && chunkp്	null) do  
14            T=chunkp+ITi; //concatenate all terms in chunkp with ITi 
15             if (not(checkDisclosure(C,g(C),T))) then  //PMI(ck;T)≤IC(g(ck)) ck ϵ	C 
16              location_found=true; //ITi does not cause disclosure in chunkp 
17               add(ITi,chunkp);  
18      remove(ITi,RTi); //ITi has been already allocated 
19      ITi=getRemainingTerms(RTi); //evaluate the remaining terms 
20            else 
21               chunkp=next(Chunk_set); //if disclosure, check the next chunk 
22             end if 
23          end while 
24          if (not(location_found)) then 
25     if (|ITi|==1) then //ITi cannot be split 
26      chunkp=new_chunk(ITi); //create a new chunk with ITi 
      //add the new chunk sorted by increasing disclosure level  
27            addSorted(chunkp,Chunk_set);  
28      remove(ITi,RTi); //ITi has been already allocated in a new chunk 
29      ITi=getRemainingTerms(RTi); 
30     else  //if ITi can be split 
31      ITi=getMostInformativeTerm(RTi);  
32     end if 
33          end if 
34      end while 
35   end if 
36 end while 
37  for each chunkp in Chunk_set do 
38   cLoc=storeSeparateCloudLocation(chunkp); //outsource the chunk to the cloud 
39   add(cLoc,list_cLoc_chunks); //add it to a list of cloud locations  
40 end for 
40 doc_cLoc=storeSeparateCloudLocation(D’); //outsource the sanitized document  
41 storeLocally(doc_cLoc); //store locally the location of the sanitized doc 
 //generate the sort lists of ids and of chunk locations+offsets for quasi-ids 
42 [sort_list_ids,sort_list_cLoc]=getSortList(list_ids,Chunk_set,list_cLoc_chunks,D); 
43 storeMetadataLocally(sort_list_ids,sort_list_cLoc);  
 
Algorithm 2 iteratively allocates each set of risky terms RTi detected by Algorithm 1. If terms 
are individually risky, those replaced by the sentinel $id$ within the sanitized version D’ of the 
original document D (line 5) are temporally stored. If we are dealing with a set of quasi-
identifying terms, we replace each of them by the sentinel $qid$ in D’ (line 8) and we first try to 
allocate the term ITi within the set RTi with the highest information content, because it is the one 
that would likely cause the largest disclosure. The algorithm then iterates the set of data chunks 
that have been created so far (lines 13-23) and evaluates whether the terms already in the chunkp 
plus the new term to be allocated (ITi) fulfill the privacy criterion (line 15). If this is the case, ITi 
is stored in the chunk and it is removed from the set of risky terms RTi to which it belonged 
(lines 18-19). Since we have removed ITi from RTi, by definition, the remaining terms in RTi 
would not cause disclosure (i.e., a set of quasi-identifiers that only cause a risk when all of them 
are evaluated in aggregate); thus, in the next iteration, we try to allocate all the remaining terms 
in RTi at once (line 19) in order to minimize the allocation effort that an individual allocation of 
terms would represent (mainly, in terms of web queries).  
If none of the available chunks have enough allocation budget (or we are at the beginning of 
the process and we have not created any chunk yet), a new chunk containing only the most 
informative term ITi (line 26) is created, or we iteratively split and evaluate the remaining terms 
in RTi, starting by the most informative one (line 31).  
The iterative process continues until all the terms in the risky combination RTi have been 
allocated in a chunk (line 10) and all risky combinations in RT have been considered (line 2). 
Then, each chunk with quasi-identifiers is outsourced to a separate cloud location cLoc (lines 
37-40), whereas the sanitized document D’ containing non-risky terms is outsourced to a single 
cloud location, which is locally stored (lines 40-41). Finally, the list of identifiers terms 
(sort_list_ids) and the list of cloud locations for the outsourced quasi-identifying terms, plus 
their offsets within the data chunk in which they are contained (sort_list_cLoc), are created and 
locally stored as metadata (lines 42-43). As detailed above, these metadata are needed to locally 
reconstruct the document D from its sanitized version D’ (retrieved from the cloud), as we will 
detail in section 4.4; to make this possible, their contents (i.e., identifying terms and cloud 
locations of quasi-identifying terms, respectively) are sorted in the order of appearance of the 
terms in the original document D. 
4.3. Minimizing the number of cloud locations 
To minimize the number of cloud locations required to store data while fulfilling the privacy 
criterion, Algorithms 1 and 2 incorporate several heuristics to prune and guide the evaluation of 
risky term sets and data chunks. Notice that the optimal minimization (with regard to the 
assessment of combinations and the allocation of their terms) is NP-hard, because it would 
require evaluating all the possible combinations of any cardinally and every possible allocation 
of terms; this hardness, which is common to any privacy method that aims at balancing the 
trade-off between privacy and data utility [41], is impractical for large documents and would 
require an enormous number of probability calculation queries to evaluate the informativeness 
of all possible combinations of any cardinality. To render the solution practical, the greedy 
algorithms detailed above are guided by the following heuristics: 
 Evaluate first the disclosure risk of combinations of terms T with the lowest cardinality 
(see Algorithm 1). In this manner, we avoid starting the analysis with large sets of terms 
for which, in case of disclosure of a certain ck, we would not able to discern which of the 
tj in T are strongly related with ck and, thus, effectively cause the disclosure, and those 
that are irrelevant. Thus, to avoid unnecessary splitting, which will require a larger 
number of locations to accommodate the terms to be protected, we begin the analysis with 
individual terms, and only when the disclosure of individual terms has been assessed, we 
move to combinations of cardinality 2, 3, etc. Moreover, once an individual term or a 
combination of terms is identified as risky, those terms will not be considered in the next 
iteration (line 7 of Algorithm 1), either during the evaluation of combinations of the same 
cardinality, or during the creation of subsequent combinations with larger cardinality. In 
this manner, we prune unnecessary assessments of disclosure risk.  
 At each iteration, both algorithms evaluate first those terms with the highest 
informativeness. In Algorithm 1, this is applied when creating term combinations (line 2). 
The idea is to begin the assessment of disclosure with the terms that, due to their 
inherently high informativeness, are more likely to reveal the semantics of the entities in 
C. In this manner, the most potentially risky terms (and their combinations) are evaluated 
first, thus contributing to minimize the amount of terms tagged as risky, because risky 
terms cannot be used anymore to create new combinations (line 7 of Algorithm 1). 
Likewise, in Algorithm 2, the informativeness of terms is used to guide their allocation 
(line 9 of Algorithm 2). Highly informative risky terms are the first that are allocated to 
chunks, which will likely correspond to an empty chunk, because these are the ones that 
impose the stricter restriction and, thus, the most difficult to allocate. This strategy will 
also minimize the number of unsuccessful evaluations of disclosure during the process of 
location search. 
 Finally, chunks are sorted and evaluated according to the level of aggregated disclosure 
that the terms already allocated to them produce (line 27 of Algorithm 2). The chunk with 
the lowest disclosure is evaluated first when allocating a new term. With this strategy, we 
try to maximize the chance of discovering a valid chunk with the least number of attempts 
(because we try the easiest allocation first), and tend to produce a more even distribution 
of terms in the different chunks, so that chunks incur in similar levels of disclosure. 
 
By using the heuristic greedy Algorithms 1 and 2, we transform a NP-hard problem into a 
feasible one that scales quadratically w.r.t. the number of terms in the document; this cost is in 
line with other data protection mechanisms that aim at balancing the tradeoff between privacy 
protection and data utility [42]. Moreover, the heuristics we use to bind, sort and prune the 
evaluation of terms contribute significantly lower the number of actual combinations to 
evaluate. 
4.4. Queries and data retrieval 
One of the main benefits of data splitting over cryptographic approaches is the possibility to 
straightforwardly support functionalities over outsourced split data. In this section, we discuss 
how user queries requesting functionalities over the documents split with our method can be 
satisfied by the local proxy.  
 Document retrieval: to retrieve the whole content of a specific document, the proxy will 
retrieve from its local metadata database i) the sorted list of identifying terms 
(sort_list_ids) ii) the sorted list of cloud locations plus the offset within the data chunk of 
the quasi-identifying terms (sort_list_cLoc) and iii) the location of the outsourced 
sanitized document D’ (doc_cLoc). Then, as many retrieval queries as document chunks 
(plus one more for the sanitized document D’) will be executed in parallel toward the 
respective cloud locations. Once all partial results have been gathered, the proxy will 
reconstruct the complete document by i) replacing removed identifiers ($id$) in the 
sanitized document with those locally stored in the same order and, ii) replacing removed 
quasi-identifiers ($qi$) in the sanitized document D’ with those retrieved from the clouds, 
in the same order, and by considering their relative offset within their chunk.  
 Keyword searches: complex keyword searches involving one or several keywords even 
involving regular expressions can be easily implemented by broadcasting the search 
query over all the pieces, including the locally stored identifiers and those pieces 
outsourced to the cloud (as stated in the metadata), of a specific document or a collection 
of documents. Then, the set of Boolean results (i.e., query match/mismatch) obtained for 
each document can be locally aggregated with an OR operator in order to obtain the 
complete query result (i.e., whether the document, as a whole, matches the query). For 
conjunctive queries involving Boolean combinations of keywords (AND, OR, NOT), a 
similar process can be implemented by i) decomposing the conjunctive query in several 
non-conjunctive queries (one for each keyword), ii) broadcasting the queries over the 
different document pieces, and iii) aggregating the set of partial results of each non-
conjunctive query with an OR and iv) aggregating the aggregated non-conjunctive query 
results with the initial Boolean combination. If the search query also expects retrieving 
the matching document(s), the previous process will be followed by the document 
retrieval depicted above. 
 Document updates: partial updates corresponding to modifications performed over a 
retrieved document are also straightforward. For partial deletions, removed terms only 
need to be removed either from the local metadata database (if they were identifiers) or 
from the outsourced document chunks. Because removing terms from outsourced chunks 
lowers the amount of disclosed information per chunk, it does not violate the privacy 
requirements. For term replacements, we only need to check whether the term 
replacement fulfills the privacy requirements in the document chunk of the original term: 
in the affirmative case, we can just replace the term in the chunk; otherwise, we need to 
remove the original term and allocate the replacement in a chunk suitable for the privacy 
requirements. Term additions are handed similarly to the latter case: the proxy evaluates 
their sensitiveness and allocate them in an existing or new chunk, accordingly. In all 
cases, the local metadata is updated to properly reconstruct the document.  
5. Security and functional analysis 
In this section, we discuss the security of the splitting mechanism in comparison with 
cryptographic approaches. Moreover, we also discuss the preservation of outsourced 
functionalities and the effort needed to support them with the two approaches. 
With data splitting, each cloud receives a data chunk that fulfills the privacy requirements. 
Since these requirements are defined as an instantiation of the C-sanitization privacy model, we 
have the a priori privacy guarantee that the level of disclosure of each data chunk does not 
disclose more sensitive information than that defined in the privacy requirements (the disclosure 
threshold g(c)) for each sensitive entity (c) (Definition 2). This a priori guarantee is, in essence, 
conceptually equivalent to that of other well-known privacy models for database releases [43] 
(such as k-anonymity [27, 28]): with C-sanitization-driven data splitting we ensure that potential 
disclosure inferences are ambiguous (i.e., non-unequivocal) for each sensitive entity c, with a 
level of ambiguity defined by the disclosure threshold. Obviously, because split data are stored 
in clear, some partial information is leaked to each cloud (as it is the case for k-anonymous data 
releases that also assume that the released data should be useful for third parties), but with the 
guarantee that c cannot be unequivocally disclosed (also as with k-anonymity, which ensures 
that the probability of disclosing the protected entity is 1/k).  
Assuming that clouds do not collude, further operations over the split outsourced data, 
including retrieval, queries, updates, and deletions, which are independently executed over 
individual cloud locations, would reveal no additional information to each individual cloud. If 
the clouds collude, they may try to reconstruct data by aggregating data chunks, but this can be 
hardly made unequivocally because of the potential number of feasible aggregations without 
knowing the splitting criterion. Moreover, the fact that a single cloud location may indistinctly 
store partial data of several independent documents (i.e., merged split data) will largely increase 
the number of feasible aggregations and, thus, decrease the probability of a successful 
disclosure inference [44]. 
Other than the evaluation of the sensitiveness of terms (which is done once at the storage 
stage), no other costly operation is needed to manage and query data, which are functionalities 
much more common than storage, and for which fast response times are expected. Moreover, as 
detailed in section 4.4, search, retrieval and update queries with a high level of expressiveness 
(e.g., conjunctive queries, regular expressions, etc.) can be seamlessly supported by 
broadcasting the query to the appropriate cloud locations and aggregating the results in 
coherence with the query syntax. Moreover, partial queries are transparently and efficiently 
executed by cloud service providers, which do not need to be aware of the fact that data are split 
(i.e., they do not need to modify the logic of their services); cloud providers also receive clear 
partial data that are still analytically useful. Finally, local aggregations made on the proxy side 
on partial results are also efficient, since they consist on logical operators on clear data. As a 
matter of fact, all the operations on outsourced data discussed in the former section scale 
linearly to the number of terms in the document, in the worst case. 
Moreover, the multi-cloud notion exploited by our data splitting mechanism may not only be 
used to enforce privacy-preserving storage, but to ensure robustness against cloud failures: by 
redundantly storing the data chunks in different cloud locations, we ensure the availability of the 
data in the event of failure or data loss by one or several CSPs. Obviously, additional cloud 
locations would be needed to redundantly store data chunks, in the same way as additional 
physical drives are needed to achieve data redundancy on local premises. 
In comparison, functionality-preserving encryption mechanisms, which can be either based 
on homomorphic encryption or on searchable encryption, offer more robust privacy because no 
clear data is outsourced to the cloud, but they require managing sensitive cryptographic 
material. Moreover, the fact that the complete data is stored in a unique cloud makes it possible 
for the cloud provider to learn some query and data patterns, such as which pieces of data seem 
to be correlated because they are queried conjunctively. From a functional perspective, they also 
suffer from several limitations. On the one hand, homomorphic encryption [6] allows 
processing encrypted data without decrypting them, but the computational cost is prohibitive, 
both for clouds providers, which execute the operations, and for the local proxy, which 
orchestrates the process and decrypts the results. Moreover, in order to coherently operate over 
the encrypted outsourced data, so that a correct result can be decrypted on local premises, the 
cloud provider should use specially tailored operators. Thus, cloud providers should be aware of 
the fact that they are dealing with encrypted data and should agree on modifying the logic of 
their services. This is unfeasible in many commercial scenarios, especially for free cloud 
services, for which cloud providers expect gaining some utility from the users’ data.  
On the other hand, searchable encryption [7] offers a more computationally viable solution 
to support searches and retrieval on encrypted data, but still requires adapting the cloud services 
to operate on such encrypted data. Moreover, additional data (i.e., encrypted search indexes) 
need to be attached to the outsourced encrypted dataset and, because of this, all the queries that 
are expected to be performed over the data should be known beforehand. This complicates data 
updates, which usually require retrieving, decrypting and updating the whole dataset, re-creating 
the search indexes, and re-encrypt and re-upload the dataset to the cloud. Moreover, 
computationally complex solutions (both for clouds and for the local proxy) relying on 
additional search indexes (e.g., hierarchical indexes) and multiple successive queries are needed 
to support queries other than single keyword searches [45]. Finally, even though some 
approaches have been proposed to support queries with multiple keywords [46] or conjunctive 
queries [47], they are still far from the fully transparent, efficient and flexible query support 
offered by data splitting. 
6. Evaluation 
There are two aspects of the proposed system that can be evaluated: the accuracy of the 
detection of risky terms (which is based on the information theoretic enforcement of the C-
sanitization model) and the effectiveness of the splitting process. The results of the former have 
been already reported, evaluated and discussed in [25, 26], which shows that the 
implementation of the C-sanitization model with moderately general thresholds achieves a 
performance comparable to that of human sanitizers. In the following, we report the results and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the splitting process and the proposed heuristics in reducing the 
number of cloud locations with a corpus similar to that used in the literature on document 
sanitization [24, 25, 48].  
6.1. Evaluation data and case studies 
As evaluation data, we took the same document corpus that was used in [20, 25, 26] to measure 
the accuracy of the detection of risky terms. It consists of a set of Wikipedia articles describing 
some entities/topics that are sensitive according to the current legal frameworks on data privacy 
(HIV, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs), homosexuality and Catholicism) and a highly 
sensitive individual (Osama Bin Laden). Regarding the former, U.S. federal laws on medical 
data privacy [35, 36] mandate hospitals and healthcare organizations to protect any references 
made to STDs and HIV status in patient medical records before releasing them to, for example, 
insurance companies in response to Worker’s Compensation or Motor Vehicle Accident claims. 
To do so, those terms explicitly referring to these diseases and those semantically related ones, 
such as treatments or symptoms, should be protected [19]. Likewise, the EU Data Protection 
Directive [38] states that the information related to the religion and sexual orientation of EU 
citizens should be protected in order to avoid possible discrimination. In all these cases, 
attribute disclosure protection should be provided (i.e., the confidential information related to 
the individual should not be disclosed). For the case of Osama Bin Laden, the identity of the 
individual should not be disclosed [20], that is, the document should protect against identity 
disclosure. Wikipedia articles have been used by related works since they configure a 
challenging data protection scenario because of their tight and semantically rich discourses [20]. 
To offer the kind of data protection needed for each document, we have employed different 
instantiations of the C-sanitization model. First, a basic HIV- STD- Homosexuality- 
Catholicism- Bin Laden-sanitization has been individually applied for the respective documents, 
in which individual terms or term combinations that unequivocally reveal the entities to be 
protected were considered risky. Afterwards, semantically coherent generalizations (extracted 
from WordNet) have been used as thresholds to state the maximum level of allowed disclosure. 
Virus, Infection and Condition were used as generalizations of HIV, Disease for STD, Sexuality 
for Homosexuality, Religion for Catholicism and Person for Bin Laden.  
These case studies also illustrate how the C-sanitization model can be intuitively instantiated 
in coherence with the privacy notions stated in current legislations on data protection (which are 
defined at a conceptual -rather than statistical- level) and for different privacy requirements (i.e., 
different levels of protection against identify and/or attribute disclosure).  
6.2. Testing configurations and evaluation metrics 
To evaluate the benefits brought by the semantic data splitting algorithm, the following splitting 
strategies have been implemented and applied for the evaluation corpus: 
 A naïve approach in which each sensitive term is stored in an individual location. This 
completely uninformed strategy trivially fulfills the privacy requirements, even though it 
would likely require a large number of locations. 
 Algorithm 2 without the heuristics that sort the terms and chunks in order to maximize the 
chance of finding a valid allocation. In this case, terms are managed in the same order as 
they appear in the document and chunks are evaluated by their order of creation. 
 Algorithm 2 with the proposed heuristics, as detailed in Section 4.2.  
 
To measure the effectiveness of each splitting strategy, we defined and quantified the 
following quality metrics: 
 Number of cloud locations needed to ensure that all the data chunks stored in clear form 
fulfill the privacy requirements. This is a crucial aspect because, in general, the larger the 
number of locations is, the higher the storage cost the user and/or the CSP will incur in. In 
addition, more locations imply that more (partial) queries should be broadcasted to fulfill 
a given query and more (partial) results should be aggregated to provide the complete 
result to the user (as detailed in section 4.4). Notice that, in all cases, an additional 
location will be needed to store the remaining non-risky text from the input document.  
 Disclosure balance between cloud locations. Because sets of terms are stored together 
according to the aggregated amount of information they disclose, a good allocation (in 
terms of an optimal use of the available resources) will be such that the aggregated 
disclosure at each location is, in average, the nearest (but always below) to the disclosure 
threshold defined by the model instantiation. Moreover, a good disclosure balance will be 
reflected by a low variance between the disclosure level of the term sets stored at each 
location; in this way, we achieve a similar level of (controlled) disclosure and avoid that 
some locations disclose significantly more information whereas others disclose 
significantly less. Specifically, the heuristics presented in section 4.3, which sort locations 
and terms to allocate, pursue this even balancing. To measure the effectiveness of the 
heuristics, we also computed the arithmetic average and the standard deviation of the 
aggregated disclosure of the set to terms stored in a chunk at each location. To offer 
figures that can be directly compared for the different documents and model 
instantiations, we normalized each of these metrics by the informativeness of the 
disclosure threshold (g(C)) stated in the model instantiation:  
_ 100,
( _ )
Normalized metric
metric
IC disclosure threshold
 
    
(4) 
where metric corresponds to either the arithmetic average or the standard deviation of the 
aggregated disclosure of the locations in use (computed with Eq. (2)). A good normalized 
average will be such that is near 100% (because it used most of the allocation budget of 
the locations in use), whereas a good normalized deviation will be such that is near 0% 
(because all the locations offer a similar level of disclosure).
 
6.3. Results and discussion 
The evaluation metrics for the different documents, model instantiations, splitting strategies and 
heuristics in use are shown in Tables 1-4. We also show in these tables the percentage of terms 
from the whole document that were tagged as identifiers (i.e., they individually disclose more 
information than that allowed by the model instantiation) and quasi-identifiers (i.e., those that 
only cause disclosure when they co-occur with other quasi-identifiers). 
 
 
Table 1. Evaluation metrics for the document about HIV with different splitting strategies and privacy 
requirements. 
Privacy model  
instantiation 
% Identifiers % Quasi-
identifiers
Splitting  
strategy
#Locations
(Q-Ids)
Norm. Avg. 
Disclosure 
Norm. 
Std. Dev.
HIV-sanitization 
 
 
6.9% 15.2% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
24
10
9
76.6% 
89.35% 
90.20% 
20.01%
17.60%
9.76%
(HIV, Virus)- 
Sanitization 
 
10.1% 13.9% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
22
10
9
79.7% 
91.0% 
94.87% 
14.86%
7.46%
3.54%
(HIV, Infection)- 
sanitization  
 
6.3% 10.8% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
17
9
6
78.24% 
95.42% 
94.55% 
24.4%
6.81%
5.67%
(HIV, condition)- 
sanitization 
 
23.4% 1.3% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
2
2
2
78.91% 
78.91% 
78.91% 
3.03%
3.03%
3.03%
 
 
Table 2. Evaluation metrics for the document about STDs with different splitting strategies and privacy 
requirements. 
Privacy model  
instantiation 
% Identifiers % Quasi-
identifiers
Splitting  
strategy
#Locations
(Q-Ids)
Norm. Avg. 
Disclosure 
Norm. 
Std. Dev.
STD-sanitization 
 
 
5.7% 10.7% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
56
19
15
65.06% 
78.65% 
86.87% 
39.28%
22.52%
16.59%
(STD, disease)- 
sanitization 
 
4.4% 11.8% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
62
26
19
65.84% 
74.7% 
90.92% 
34.7%
23.39%
20.48%
 
 
Table 3. Evaluation metrics for the document about Catholicism with different splitting strategies and 
privacy requirements. 
Privacy model  
instantiation 
% Identifiers % Quasi-
identifiers
Splitting  
strategy
#Locations
(Q-Ids)
Norm. Avg. 
Disclosure 
Norm. 
Std. Dev. 
Catholicism-
sanitization 
 
4.8% 14.5% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
18
8
7
77.52% 
84.59% 
87.14% 
26.44% 
25.05% 
15.3% 
(Catholicism, 
religion)-
sanitization 
9.7% 9.7% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
12
7
6
79.21% 
80.82% 
86.49% 
21.42% 
12.4% 
7.32% 
 
 
 
Table 4. Evaluation metrics for the document about homosexuality with different splitting strategies and 
privacy requirements. 
Privacy model  
instantiation 
% Identifiers % Quasi-
identifiers
Splitting  
strategy
#Locations
(Q-Ids)
Norm. Avg. 
Disclosure 
Norm. 
Std. Dev.
homosexuality- 
sanitization 
 
2.1% 12.9% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
48
8
5
63.04% 
77.31% 
81.72% 
51.21%
28.1%
15.78%
(homosexuality,  
sexuality)- 
sanitization 
2.4% 13.8% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
50
15
13
63.81% 
75.29% 
81.79% 
40.02%
21.98%
17.36%
 
Table 5. Evaluation metrics for the document about Osama Bin Laden with different splitting strategies 
and privacy requirements. 
Privacy model  
instantiation 
% Identifiers % Quasi-
identifiers
Splitting  
strategy
#Locations
(Q-Ids)
Norm. Avg. 
Disclosure 
Norm. 
Std. Dev. 
Bin Laden- 
sanitization 
0.3% 7.2% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
20
3
2
64.54% 
88.63% 
94.81% 
21.16% 
4.28% 
3.56% 
(Bin Laden,  
person)-
sanitization 
5.4% 10.8% Naïve 
No heuristics 
Heuristics
30
15
10
71.1% 
71.2% 
73.5% 
30% 
24.87% 
20.72% 
 
First, we observe that the percentage of identifying terms increases as the sanitization 
threshold becomes more general. This is coherent, because a general threshold means that only 
the most general terms related to entity to be protected can be left in clear, and that any term that 
is a specialization of the disclosure threshold becomes an identifier that cannot be stored in clear 
without violating the privacy requirements. Notice that, because of the need to locally store 
them within the proxy, they consume local storage resources. However, one can see from the 
tables that the locally stored identifiers account a small percentage of the total amount of data to 
be outsourced; moreover, it is important to recall that the kind of documents we are using here 
constitute a worst-case scenario for data protection: in practice, most document would not be as 
disclosive and focused as Wikipedia articles describing a sensitive entity.  
We also observe that the number of locations needed to store quasi-identifiers in a privacy 
preserving way also increases as the threshold becomes general, regardless of the splitting 
strategy. Again, a general threshold means that more and more terms co-occurring in the 
document can disclose, in aggregate, more information than that specified by the threshold. 
However, the strictest privacy criterion imposed by the more general thresholds limits the 
number of terms that can be stored together and, thus, increases the number of locations we 
need. The only exception is the HIV document, for which most quasi-identifiers become 
identifiers, which can be stored in just one location but in an encrypted form, when setting a 
very general threshold. 
By comparing the different splitting strategies, we clearly see that the naïve approach 
provides the worst results, since it requires the largest number of locations. Algorithm 2, on the 
other hand, significantly reduces the number of needed locations since it tries to fit as many 
terms as possible in each location as long as the privacy requirements are fulfilled. The 
heuristics incorporated into the algorithm also help to improve the allocation efficiency. By 
sorting terms in decreasing order of informativeness, we tend to allocate first those terms that 
impose the strictest restriction and that will consequently be more difficult to allocate. On the 
other hand, by sorting locations in increasing order of aggregated disclosure, we try first those 
chunks in which it is more feasible to fit a new term because there is still disclosure budget 
before violating the privacy requirements. This not only provides a more efficient use of the 
available resources, but decreases the number of unsuccessful allocation attempts in comparison 
with the non-heuristic strategy. The heuristic approach provides the largest relative 
improvement over the other strategies when the least strict privacy criteria are specified, i.e., 
when no generalizations are used as disclosure thresholds. Indeed, this setting provides more 
degrees of freedom to allocate terms while still fulfilling the privacy model, which our 
algorithms takes advantage of. 
The effectiveness of the allocation process is also illustrated by the balance of disclosure 
levels through the different locations in use. We see that, for the heuristic approach, the 
normalized average is always the highest, and quite near 100%; this indicates that the disclosure 
budget offered by each location with regards to the threshold has been mostly consumed. 
Likewise, the normalized deviation between locations is always very low (3-16%), which shows 
that the disclosure levels of the different locations have been evenly balanced. If we disable the 
heuristics, results are slightly worse and they get much worse with the naïve approach. In this 
last case, the allocation is almost random, which means that a lot of allocation budget is wasted. 
Results are also coherent for all the documents, regardless that the privacy requirements refer 
to confidential data (i.e., attribute disclosure), such as diseases, or to identifying data (i.e., 
identity disclosure), such as person names. Qualitatively, we observed that the heuristic splitting 
strategy “smartly” tended to store together those terms that offer redundant information (e.g., 
different lexicalizations or synonyms) because their co-occurrence does not significantly 
increase the disclosure level of the chunk, whereas disjoint complementary terms with minimal 
mutual information are stored separately. 
7. Conclusions and future work 
So far, data encryption has been the main privacy protection technique employed to protect data 
outsourced to the cloud, even though it usually hampers efficiency, both on cloud and local 
sides and both for storage and search/retrieval operations, it is not transparent for cloud 
providers, offers a limited support for outsourced functionalities and adds a number of burdens, 
such as local management of keys, need to deploy specially tailored software modules in the 
cloud to support certain outsourced functionalities, etc. In contrast, the semantic data splitting 
mechanism we propose in this paper offers an interesting alternative: because all the outsourced 
data are stored in (partial) clear form, data management is scalable and efficient, especially 
during the most common search and retrieval operations, it is fully transparent for cloud 
providers, which are not aware of the data protection and that can maintain their services intact, 
and outsourced functionalities are straightforwardly preserved, even for highly expressive 
search queries. Moreover, our approach builds on the a priori privacy guarantees offered by the 
C-sanitization model [25] that, contrary to other more abstract privacy models focused on 
numerical and structured data, can be intuitively instantiated at a conceptual level by using 
linguistic labels. This allows users to easily define their privacy requirements without requiring 
them to be aware of the technicalities related to data protection, and also permits a seamless 
enforcement of available legislations on data privacy, which are also qualitative. The model also 
allows defining the degree of protection applied over the data as a function of the amount of 
semantics that can be disclosed. As it has been shown in the evaluation, this also enables to 
balance the tradeoff between the level of privacy and the amount of resources (i.e., cloud 
locations and local storage) needed to enforce it. 
Compared to other protection mechanisms based on data splitting, the inherently semantic 
ground of our approach makes it possible to automatically evaluate the privacy risks of the data 
according to the semantics they disclose. This relieves the users from the burden of manually 
identifying sensitive pieces of data (e.g., attributes in a database or specific terms in a textual 
document), as needed by related works [13, 14, 18], and offers a natural support for 
unstructured textual data, which can be hardly managed by most of the available privacy 
protection solutions [25].  
In this paper, we have specifically focused on textual documents that constitute a privacy 
challenge because of their textual content and lack of structure. However, our method can also 
be applied in structured data bases (i.e., by means of vertical splitting). As future work, we plan 
to study this possibility by centering the risk assessment on automatically detecting 
combinations of attribute values that cause disclosure. Moreover, since our method also offers 
some protection against collusions of several CSPs, by seamlessly merging partial data of 
several users using the same proxy at the same location, we will also evaluate its effectiveness 
against standard attacks, and we will study how we can improve it by appropriately merging 
data chunks at each cloud location. 
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